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Interaction between compatibility and
congruency
A B S T R A C T
We argue that stimulus uncertainty induces a cognitive state that can be linked to a concept that has been
formerly described as ‘curiosity’ (Berlyne, 1949) – a state that motivates the agent to reduce the uncertainty by
exploring it. In two attention filtering tasks we varied response compatibility and stimulus congruency. In ad-
dition, we manipulated whether stimulus congruency was predictable or random. In conditions with random
presentation the impact of congruency on compatibility was more pronounced suggesting that stimulus con-
gruency was processed more strongly in a random environment. While this makes no sense from a short term
strategic perspective in the laboratory, this allocation of attention to uncertain stimulus conditions makes perfect
sense outside the laboratory. The impact of uncertainty on attentional control should not be considered a leakage
but rather an investment into possible future opportunities.
1. Introduction
The proverb “curiosity killed the cat, but satisfaction brought it
back” draws attention to the fact that exploration is risky but necessary
to reduce uncertainty. The urge to explore novel situations can be ob-
served in many species and in humans in particular. Berlyne (1949,
1960) attributed these observations to curiosity, a cognitive state that is
triggered by uncertainty-inducing stimulus conditions and that moti-
vates the agent to reduce this uncertainty by exploring it.
Uncertainty and uncertainty-reducing mechanisms played a major
role in the 1950–70s and have seen a renaissance in recent predictive-
coding approaches (Clark, 2013), but with little impact on the study of
human attention and the still open question regarding the interplay of
exogenous/bottom-up and endogenous/top-down attention (Theeuwes,
2010). While some maintain that information processing is fully con-
trolled by ‘attentional control sets’ (Folk, Remington, & Johnston,
1992), others claim that sufficiently salient task-irrelevant stimuli can
capture attention irrespective of attentional goals (Theeuwes, 1992).
Awh, Belopolsky, and Theeuwes (2012) suggested giving up the strict
opposition of exogenous and endogenous factors and to add the ‘history
of selection and reward processes’ as a factor that comprises of both
bottom-up and top-down aspects. We agree with this integrative ap-
proach but consider the list of relevant factors incomplete without ex-
plicit reference to uncertainty.
Uncertainty may be easy to overlook in attentional studies, as par-
ticipants are provided with information that reduces it – e.g., by
instructions regarding relevant and irrelevant stimuli or stimulus
probabilities. Under ecologically more valid conditions, however, un-
certainty is likely to be more relevant. Our main claim consists in the
assumption that uncertainty draws attention towards the uncertainty-
inducing stimulus dimension. This assumption is shared by various
theoretical ideas and models, such as Berlyne (1960), Bruce and Tsotsos
(2009), Schultz (2000), or Feldman & Friston (2010) — who all claim
that attention is drawn most to the source of the greatest uncertainty/
surprise.
Here we report two experiments that tested this hypothesis by
presenting participants with visual target stimuli that were accom-
panied (Experiment 1) or preceded (Experiment 2) by irrelevant dis-
tractors. Distractors could be target/response compatible or in-
compatible (Compatibility) and differ or not from the target on a
nominally task-irrelevant dimension (color in Experiment 1 or location
in Experiment 2; Congruency). Based on previous research, it was ex-
pected that Congruency would modulate the compatibility effect: in-
congruent stimulus displays should lead to smaller compatibility effects
since perceptually incongruent distractors are easier to ignore and
hence influence responding less while congruent displays should lead to
larger compatibility effects since perceptually congruent distractors are
harder to ignore and hence influence responding stronger (see Banks &
Prinzmetal, 1976; Diedrichsen, Ivry, Cohen & Danziger, 2000; Eriksen
& Eriksen, 1979; Zeischka, Coomans, Deroost, Vandenbossche, &
Soetens, 2011).
Importantly, the congruency manipulation was either blocked or
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random, assuming that random presentation increases stimulus un-
certainty (that is in the random condition there was variance on the
congruency-dimension whereas in the blocked condition there was
none).1 We hypothesized, inspired by curiosity predictions of Berlyne
(1949, 1960), that greater attention to a particular stimulus dimension
should increase the impact that the stimulus sharing this dimension has
on selection. Thus, the interaction between Compatibility and Con-
gruency should be more pronounced with random than with blocked
presentation (i.e. we expected the three-way interaction of Compat-





Thirty-two students from the University of Trier took part in this
study in fulfillment of course requirement. One participant was ex-
cluded because of high error rates (19.73%). The mean age was
21.9 years (6 male, 18–33 years), all participants reported normal or
corrected-to-normal vision. Sample-size was planned for a middle effect
size around dz∼ 0.5 based on previous research on flanker effects and
aiming for a power of 1− ß > 0.80 (calculations were run with G-
Power 3.1; Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009).
2.1.2. Stimuli and apparatus
The experiment was conducted in sound-protected testing booths.
Instructions and stimuli were presented on a standard 22-inch. color
monitor (1680× 1050 pixels) and a refresh rate of 60 Hz. The in-
structions were presented in white on black background, and the dis-
tance between participant and monitor was approximately 60 cm.
Responses were measured with a standard PC mouse. The experiment
was created with E-Prime software (version 2.0). The letters D, F, J and
K (font: Courier New) served as flankers and targets. Letters were ap-
proximately 0.85° in height and 0.85° in width. A row of five letters
appeared in each trial, a central target with two identical flankers on
the left and right side. The target did not appear exactly at screen center
but was shifted 4% (1.9 cm, 1.84°) to the left or right from the center to
make spatial selection harder. Letters in the practice phase appeared in
white (CIE L * a * b-value: 100, 0, 0), in the experimental trials they
appeared in red (CIE L * a * b-value: 53, 80, 67), or lime (CIE L * a * b-
value: 88, −86, 83).
2.1.3. Procedure
Participants were instructed to respond as rapidly and as correctly
as possible to the middle letter of the string. The letters D and F were
mapped to one mouse-key and the letters J and K to the other, the
stimulus-response mapping was counterbalanced across participants. In
50% of all trials, the incompatible trials, the flankers and the target
indicated different responses. In the other 50%, the compatible trials,
the target and the flankers indicated the same response. In 50% of all
compatible trials, target and flankers were identical (e.g., target F and
flankers F) and in the other 50%, target and flankers were different
(e.g., target F and flankers D).
Each trial was initiated by 300-ms blank interval and a plus sign
serving as fixation mark presented for 400ms at screen center. After a
blank interval of 600ms, the target-flanker string appeared for 200ms,
followed by another blank interval until the response was given or
1000ms had passed. Participants could respond to the target with the
onset of the flanker display. The target always appeared in lime.
Flankers also appeared in lime (congruent condition) in 50% of all trials
and in red (incongruent condition) in the other 50%. In the blocked-
presentation condition, all 128 trials of the congruent condition were
presented in one block and all 128 trials of the incongruent condition in
another. In the random-presentation condition, congruent and incon-
gruent trials were randomly intermixed in two 128-trial blocks. Block
sequence was counterbalanced across participants.
Participants began by performing two training blocks with error
feedback. In the first (24-trial) block, participants were presented only
with the target to learn the stimulus-response mapping. In the second
(64-trial) block, both targets and flankers presented in white. Each
experimental block started with 24 warmup trials (that were not further
analyzed) and then proceeded with the 128 experimental trials.
Overall, participants performed 512 experimental trials, and breaks
were offered every 40 trials. If the program detected incorrect or
missing responses in three consecutive trials, an additional break was
recommended.
2.1.4. Analysis
Here we consider only trials in which flankers and targets were ei-
ther identical or response-incompatible—the most common conditions
in flanker experiments and to make Experiment 1 more comparable to
Experiment 2; for more elaborate analyses including also sequential
analyses see the online supplement. Note that neither Compatibility nor
Congruency sequential effects did influence the main result reported
below (that is the three-way interaction between Compat-
ibility×Congruency×Presentation) and that the pattern still holds if
all trials are included. Reaction times (RTs) from correct trials, after
excluding those with RTs shorter than 200ms or longer than 1.5 in-
terquartile ranges above the 3rd quartile of each participant’s in-
dividual RT distribution (Tukey, 1977), and error rates (ERs) were
analyzed with a 2×2×2 factorial design, with the three within-par-
ticipants factors of flanker Compatibility (identical vs. incompatible),
Congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) and Presentation (blocked vs.
random).
2.2. Results
In RTs, a MANOVA with Pillai’s trace as criterion yielded significant
main effects of Compatibility, F(1, 30)= 490.84, p < .001, ηp2= 0.94,
with faster RTs for compatible (574ms) than for incompatible trials
(636ms), and Congruency, F(1, 30)= 101.61, p < .001, ηp2= 0.77,
with faster RTs in the incongruent (588ms) than in the congruent
condition (622ms), while the main effect of Presentation was not sig-
nificant, F < 1. The interactions of Compatibility and Congruency, F(1,
30)= 53.96, p < .001, ηp2= 0.64, and of Congruency and
Presentation, F(1, 30)= 6.89, p= .014, ηp2= 0.19, were further
moderated by a significant three-way interaction, F(1, 30)= 6.42,
p= .017, ηp2= 0.18. As Fig. 1 shows, the compatibility effect was
smaller in the incongruent than in the congruent condition, and this
interaction was more pronounced with random than with blocked
presentation.
In ERs, the same analysis revealed significant main effects of
Compatibility, F(1, 30)= 19.23, p < .001, ηp2= 0.39, with fewer er-
rors in compatible (4.13%) than in incompatible trials (6.36%), and
Congruency, F(1, 30)= 11.21, p= .002, ηp2= 0.27, with fewer errors
in the incongruent (4.20%) than in the congruent condition (6.30%).
The three-way interaction was not significant, F(1, 30)= 0.02,
p= .889, ηp2= 0.00, the interaction of Compatibility and Presentation
was, F(1, 30)= 8.01, p= .008, ηp2= 0.21, indicating a stronger com-
patibility effect in the blocked (3.33%) than the random condition
(1.13%).
1 Note, that in conditions in which Congruency was blocked the amount of
compatible and incompatible trials was exactly the same as compared to con-
ditions in which Congruency was random (in other words our approach does
not investigate compatibility-proportion manipulations; e.g., Risko, Blais, Stolz,
& Besner, 2008).





Thirty-two new psychology students participated. The data of two
participants were discarded due to extremely high ER (35.94% and
31.64%). For the analyzed data, the mean age was 21.00 years (3 male,
17–27 years) and they fulfilled the same criteria as in Experiment 1.
Sample-size was planned for a middle effect size around dz∼ 0.5 based
on previous research on congruency modulations on response priming
effects and aiming for a power of 1− ß > 0.80 (calculations were run
with G-Power 3.1; Faul et al., 2009).
3.1.2. Stimuli and apparatus
These were as in Experiment 1, except that green (CIE L * a * b-
value: 46, −52, 50) and blue (CIE L * a * b-value: 32, 79, −108)
1.49°× 1.72° rectangles served as distractors and targets. The
target always appeared at screen center while the distractors were
presented at either the same central location (congruent condition) or
3.8° above and below (incongruent condition).
3.1.3. Procedure
Two stimuli appeared on two consecutive displays, and participants
were instructed to ignore the first (prime display) and respond as ra-
pidly and as correctly as possible to the color of the second (target
display). The identities of distractor and target were uncorrelated. In
50% of all trials, the incompatible trials, distractor and target indicated
different responses. In the other 50%, the compatible trials, distractor
and target indicated the same response.
Each trial was initiated by a 300-ms blank interval followed by a
central plus sign appearing for 500ms and the distractor, which ap-
peared for 30ms. The time between the onset of the distractor and the
onset of the 30-ms target varied randomly between 80 and 160ms, in
40-ms steps. Once the target disappeared, participants had to respond
within the next 1000ms. The central target appeared in blue or green to
signal the left or right mouse click. The distractor appeared in either the
same color as the target (compatible condition) or in the opposite color
(incompatible condition). Distractors appeared in either the same cen-
tral location as the target (congruent condition) or above and below
(incongruent condition). In the blocked-presentation condition, all 192
trials of the congruent condition were presented in one block and all
192 trials of the incongruent condition in another. In the random-pre-
sentation condition, congruent and incongruent trials were randomly
intermixed in two 192-trial blocks. Block sequence was
Fig. 1. Overview of stimulus conditions (stimuli not drawn to scale) and results of Experiments 1 and 2. Note that Congruency concerns color-congruency in
Experiment 1 and location-congruency in Experiment 2 (in Experiment 2 in incongruent conditions, the prime appeared either above or below the central target
location – depicted here as a full and an empty prime-rectangle). Participants classified the central letter in Experiment 1, and the color of the central rectangle on the
target-display in Experiment 2. In blocked conditions, all trials were either congruent or incongruent while in random conditions congruency varied randomly from
trial to trial (see text for a detailed explanation). Results depict mean Compatibility effects (flanker effects in Experiment 1, response priming effects in Experiment 2)
with SEs.
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counterbalanced across participants.
Participants began by performing 48 practice trials without dis-
tractor presentation and with error feedback. Each experimental block
started with 16 warmup trials (that were not further analyzed) and then
proceeded with the 192 experimental trials. Overall, participants per-
formed 768 experimental trials, and breaks were offered every 40 trials.
If the program detected incorrect or missing responses in three con-
secutive trials, an additional break was recommended.
3.2. Results
The data were treated as in Experiment 1. For sequential analyses
see the online supplement. In RTs, we obtained significant main effects
of Compatibility, F(1, 29)= 358.40, p < .001, ηp2= 0.93, with faster
responses for compatible (436ms) than for incompatible trials
(534ms), Congruency, F(1, 29)= 59.13, p < .001, ηp2= 0.67, with
faster responses for incongruent (469ms) than congruent trials
(500ms), and Presentation, F(1, 29)= 19.36, p < .001, ηp2= 0.40,
with faster response for the blocked (475ms) than the random condi-
tion (495ms). The interactions of Compatibility and Congruency, F(1,
29)= 132.27, p < .001, ηp2= 0.82, and of Compatibility and Pre-
sentation, F(1, 29)= 5.08, p= .032, ηp2= 0.15, were also significant,
as was the three-way interaction, F(1, 29)= 13.78, p= .001,
ηp
2= 0.32. As Fig. 1 shows, the compatibility effect was smaller in the
incongruent than in the congruent condition, and this interaction was
more pronounced with random than with blocked presentation.
The ER analysis yielded significant main effects of Compatibility, F
(1, 29)= 81.00, p < .001, ηp2= 0.74, with fewer errors in compatible
(2.44%) than incompatible trials (11.42%), and Congruency, F(1,
29)= 15.57, p= .001, ηp2= 0.35, with fewer errors in incongruent
(5.16%) than congruent trials (8.70%). The interactions of
Compatibility and Congruency, F(1, 29)= 13.62, p= .001, ηp2= 0.32,
and of Congruency and Presentation, F(1, 29)= 4.17, p= .050,
ηp
2= 0.13, were also significant, while the three-way interaction ap-
proached significance, F(1, 29)= 3.40, p= .075, ηp2= 0.11: the com-
patibility effect was smaller in the incongruent than in the congruent
condition, and this interaction tended to be more pronounced with
random than with blocked presentation.
4. Conclusions
We tested the hypothesis that uncertainty automatically attracts
attention – i.e. whether uncertainty with respect to a task-irrelevant
stimulus dimension attracts attention to this dimension. The main
prediction was a three-way interaction: increasing uncertainty should
boost the impact of distractor-target congruency on response-compat-
ibility effects (i.e. the two-way interaction of
Congruency×Compatibility that was expected based on previous stu-
dies should be modulated by Presentation condition). This expectation
was fully met in both experiments (the three-way interaction was sig-
nificant in the RTs in Experiment 1 and 2, and approached significance
in the error rates in Experiment 2), suggesting that uncertainty (here
variance in a task-irrelevant dimension) boosts the impact this dimen-
sion has on attentional selection (see the online supplement for a
somewhat different interpretation).
On the one hand, this fits with the general claim of Awh et al.
(2012) that the stimulus-related history is an important factor in at-
tentional control: stimulus uncertainty reflects both the relative fre-
quency with which a particular stimulus has appeared under particular
circumstances in the past and the number of alternatives that occurred
or could have occurred under these circumstances (Berlyne, 1960). On
the other hand, uncertainty does not seem to fit under the general
umbrella of selection and reward history, which renders the account of
Awh et al. incomplete.
The observation that uncertainty affects attentional control under-
scores the human brain’s key function to optimally predict, and prepare
the agent for future events (Friston, 2009; Sokolov, 1963). Prediction
relies on past experience and uncertainty reduction, so that an adaptive
attentional system should indeed direct processing to not-yet-suffi-
ciently-well predicted stimulus events or aspects thereof. While this
might not be strictly necessary for laboratory tasks, it provides the
database needed for a reliable representation of the experienced events.
The fact that these representations seem to go beyond present minimal
requirements may seem uneconomical (Mast & Frings, 2014). Yet, if we
consider that truly adaptive behavior should not only rely on persis-
tence on the current task but also to some degree rely on flexibility in
considering available alternatives that one may want to switch to
Hommel (2015), a richer-than-necessary representation of current
events makes perfect sense. From that perspective, the impact of un-
certainty on attentional control should not be considered a leakage but
rather an investment into possible future opportunities.
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